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This article focuses on the recent judgment of the Court of 
Justice, Aranyosi and Caldararu. After conducting a legal 
analysis on this case, three issues are identified and they 
are separately discussed in three sections. The aim of this 
paper is to show the impact of this judgment on public 
order and public security in Europe on the one hand and on 
the individual’s fundamental rights, on the other hand. It is 
going to be argued that even though there are limits to the 
principle of mutual recognition, this new exception based 
on fundamental rights establishes a new procedure for non-
surrender. Therefore, the Court of Justice creates a non-
execution ground which the EU legislator did not intend to 
include in the Framework Decision on the European arrest 
warrant. This is explained by looking at the three 
interconnected notions of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to offer the reader an 
assessment of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru1 judgment 
by analysing its impact on public order and public 
security in Europe on the one hand and on the 
individual’s fundamental rights, on the other hand.  In 
this case, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union(CJEU) looked at how to reconcile the reality, 
that in some Member States prison conditions fall short 
of the required standards, with the requirement, that 
states shall execute requests on the basis of the 
principle of mutual recognition as laid down in the 
Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant(FD EAW).2In essence, the Court allowed the 
executing authority to assess the standards of 
fundamental rights protection in the issuing Member 
State according to a two-tier test and, under certain 
circumstances, refuse to surrender the requested 
person. Moreover, CJEU’s conclusion that the 
presumption of mutual trust is not inviolable is a 
significant shift in approach since the Court has been 
strongly committed in its previous case-law to an 
effective surrender regime based on mutual recognition 




                                                          
1 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 April 2016, joined cases C-
404/15 and C-659/15, PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert 
Căldăraru. 
2 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 
2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 






Preliminary Analysis of the Judgment 
On the 5th of April, the CJEU delivered the Aranyosi and 
Caldararu judgment.    The central development concerned 
the interplay between the principles of mutual recognition and 
mutual trust, on the one hand, and the protection of 
fundamental rights, on the other hand. The Court was 
confronted with two (nearly identical) preliminary references 
in two cases concerning a Hungarian and Romanian national. 
The main issue in this case was whether Article 1(3) of the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant must be 
interpreted as meaning that a surrender is inadmissible if there 
is a ‘real risk’ that the requested individual’s fundamental 
rights will be infringed due to the issuing State’s poor 
detention conditions.   
According to the two European arrest warrants, Mr. Aranyosi 
forced entry into a dwelling house in Hungary and he was also 
accused of entering a school.   Mr. Caldararu was convicted 
and sentenced to an overall period of one year and eight 
months’ imprisonment for driving without a driving licence.  
Both individuals were eventually arrested in Bremen, but they 
did not consent to a simplified surrender procedure. In these 
circumstances, the Bremen Court observed that in a number 
of ECtHR’s judgments, both Romania and Hungary were 
found in violation of their ECHR obligations due to the 
overcrowding in their prisons.  As a result, the Court had no 
other choice (in the absence of an explicit fundamental rights-
based refusal ground in the FD EAW) than to refer to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
   
First, the Court begins its analysis by pointing out the 
importance of the mutual recognition principle in the ‘new 
simplified and more effective system for surrender of persons 
[…]’ which has the aim ‘to facilitate and accelerate judicial 
cooperation with a view to contributing to the objective set for 
the European Union to become an area of freedom, security 
and justice, founded on the high level of confidence which 
should exist between the Member States’.  The central role of 
mutual recognition principle was that its application should 
be possible at all stages of the proceedings: pre-trial, at trial 
and when enforcing the sentence. This has been realised by 
adopting the so-called framework decisions.  
However, it has to be pointed out that its application provides 
fragmentation of the Member States’ national legal systems. 
Mutual recognition allows not only for enhanced cooperation, 
but it also allows the EU Member States to keep their own 
national criminal law systems. That is why this principle has 
gained the ‘cornerstone’ title since it enables different legal 
systems to coexist.  Now it is important to see how the CJEU 
3 Court of Justice, judgment of 3 May 2007, case C-303/05 
Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de 
Ministerraad; See also Court of Justice, judgment of 6 
October 2009, case C-123/08 Dominic Wolzenburg; Court of 
Justice, opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014. 
Elena Emilia Popa (LLB Graduate, LLM 
Candidate)  
The Hague University of Applied Sciences 
(emiliapopa10@gmail.com) 
Dr. Luca Pantaleo (Thesis Supervisor) 
The Hague University of Applied 
Sciences 
(L.Pantaleo@hhs.nl) 
THE CLASH BETWEEN MUTUAL RECOGNITION, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC SECURITY 
 






changes its approach by moving from mutual recognition 
and mutual trust to the centrality of fundamental rights. 
  
Secondly, after reiterating the essential character of mutual 
recognition and mutual trust, the Court proceeds by referring 
to the ‘exhaustively listed’ grounds for non-execution of an 
EAW.  It argues that, ‘in principle’, mutual recognition 
obliges Member States to act on an EAW and they must only 
refuse to execute it under the circumstance laid down in 
Article 3 and Article 4 of the FD EAW.   
The Court further notes that the EAW mechanism can be 
suspended only in the event of ‘serious and persistent 
breach’ by one of the EU Member States of the principles 
enshrined in Article 2 Treaty on the European Union(TEU) 
and in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 7 
TEU.  In this context, it is important to observe that the 
Court, by pointing out that the mechanism of the EAW can 
be refused if there is a breach of the principles provided for 
in the TEU, sets the stage for a new addition to the non-
execution grounds stated in the FD EAW. 
The Framework Decision does not have an explicit 
fundamental rights clause that enables the executing state to 
refuse a person’s surrender in case there are serious doubts 
regarding the conformity with fundamental rights. This can 
be clearly deduced from the FD’s text since in Article 1(3) 
there is only a vague statement which reads as follows: “[FD 
EAW] shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation 
to respect fundamental rights […]”.  Hence, the Court tried 
to introduce this obligation (i.e. compliance with 
fundamental rights) by drawing on the recitals of the FD 
EAW, even though the preamble itself does not directly refer 
to a specific fundamental rights duty on the part of the 
executing state when it enforces an EAW. 
  
Thirdly, the Court further addresses the issue of fundamental 
rights, when it brings its two-tier ‘systematic deficiencies’ 
test closer to the standards used by the ECtHR.  This part, 
which may well be the most significant section in the 
Court’s reasoning, starts by reiterating the importance of 
Article 1(3) and the EU Member States’ obligation to 
comply with the EU Charter when implementing EU law. It 
is here where the Grand Chamber stresses the need for its 
Member States to respect Article 4 of the Charter on the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
(which is closely linked to the right to human dignity).  The 
absolute character of this provision is also confirmed by 
Article 3 ECHR.   
From this, the Court stressed that whenever there is a ‘real 
risk’ of inhuman or degrading treatment for the individual in 
the issuing Member State, the executing authority is 
required to assess the existence of this risk before deciding 
whether to surrender the requested person.   
 
Structure of the Paper 
The first chapter offers the reader an insight into the legal 
implications of the two notions, mutual recognition and 
mutual trust, which constitute the basis for the efficient 
functioning of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice(AFSJ). This chapter examines these concepts in light 
of the Court’s new decision in Aranyosi and Căldăraru case. 
Particularly, the analysis illustrates that the CJEU, drawing 
on its previous case-law, tried to answer the uncertainties 
concerning fundamental rights in the European area. It has 
done so by giving more weight to fundamental rights and 
limiting the automaticity of the EAW mechanism. However, 
this approach might give the relevant competent authorities 
a reason to doubt the system of its neighbor Member State.  
The first section of this article reiterates that the application 
of mutual recognition based on presumed mutual trust in the 
field of European criminal law was designed to achieve quasi-
automaticity in law enforcement cooperation across EU. 
However, due to a number of questions related to the ‘moral’ 
side of the mutual recognition system (i.e. the lack of attention 
to fundamental rights during this process), the Court of Justice 
has changed its approach when dealing with European Arrest 
Warrant cases.  
One way in which the Court tried to cope with the issue of 
fundamental rights during a surrender procedure was to set 
limits to the automaticity of recognition. This was done 
according to a two-tier test which allowed the executing 
authorities to proceed with a substantive examination (on a 
case-by-case basis) of fundamental rights impact. Given the 
limited space that I am given here it is not possible to go too 
much into details on this issue. Suffice it to say that the 
application of the two-tier test by national courts is likely to 
give rise to diverging interpretations due to various 
discrepancies in the national laws of the Member States. 
For instance, there is the issue of assurances provided by the 
issuing Member State.  This newly established test gives rise 
to multiple questions on whether the information delivered is 
precise enough or whether it is in accordance with the 
executing authority’s national standards. As a consequence, 
these diverging interpretations might reinforce and perpetuate 
distrust among Member States since the assurances provided 
by the issuing authorities are not legally binding, thus the 
executing authorities might be skeptical in accepting them.  
It would therefore go against not only the Union legislature’s 
intention of stipulating (exhaustively and for reasons of legal 
certainty) the cases in which the EAW may not be executed, 
but also against the case-law of the Court which applies a very 
strict interpretation of the FD and particularly of the grounds 
for refusal provided for in Article 3 and Article 4 thereof. The 
next chapter is going to discuss the implications of this new 
decision in the context of fundamental rights and the focus is 
on the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment and here 
I offer an in-depth analysis of the impact of creating a new 
ground for non-execution. 
The second chapter focuses on the issue of fundamental 
rights in the context of European prison conditions. It is 
argued that the reasoning of the Court leads to a “balancing” 
approach whereby one value is necessarily given priority at 
the expense of the other.  For this reason, it is noted that a 
“reconciliation” of the two interests at stake, namely mutual 
recognition and human rights, can constitute a better possible 
scenario for judicial cooperation. Furthermore, the newly 
established ground for non-execution based on unsatisfactory 
detention conditions leads to a difficult assessment of what 
constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment. In fact, the 
effective challenge to and monitoring of inhuman or 
degrading treatment in European prisons is limited and it 
appears that prison condition have not improved to a level that 
would satisfy the relevant standards which are laid down in 
the European Convention on Human Rights(ECHR) and 
Charter of Fundamental Rights(CFR). The focus of this article 
will then shift on the consequence of having a non-execution 
ground by using the Court’s reasoning in the N.S. case. 
This chapter aims at emphasizing that the recent cases of the 
CJEU brought about a potential conflict between the 
recognition of judicial decisions (based on trust) on the one 
hand and the use of fundamental rights considerations as a 
ground for non-execution of an EAW, on the other hand. 
Nevertheless, I supported the views of several scholars who 
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advocated for a ‘reconciliation’ between these two 
competing values, rather than employing a ‘balancing’ 
approach whereby one interest is given priority at the 
expense of the other.  
Furthermore, it is shown that the problem of prison 
overcrowding is not a new one, in fact the same issue was 
approached by the Court in its previous case-law. The CJEU 
did not give priority to fundamental rights (particularly 
article 4 of the Charter) until recently. Moreover, the Court’s 
desire to offer more value to human rights was recognized 
in the N.S. case and later on in Aranyosi and Caldararu case. 
Hence, by trying to expand the non-execution grounds to 
fundamental rights (via the use of a two-tier test), the CJEU 
risked affecting the EU secondary legislation at stake. 
Another consequence was that it also touched upon core 
aspects of Member States’ sovereignty. 
The third chapter returns to the discussion of the two 
cornerstone principles of the AFSJ, namely mutual 
recognition and mutual trust. However, this discussion 
differs from the one in the first chapter because these two 
concepts are analysed from a security perspective. In light 
of the recent judgment, the practical effects of having a non-
execution ground is discussed. As a result, it is argued that 
the unevenness of the EAW system is accentuated 
(especially in relation to the issue of prison conditions) 
because of the new refusal ground based on fundamental 
rights. Lastly, in order to offer the reader a better 
understanding of the security concerns at stake, the three 
interlinked notions of freedom, security and justice are 
described and then an explanation is provided as to how 
these concepts relate to the aforementioned issues. 
The main conclusion of this chapter is that the introduction 
of mutual recognition as a principle for international 
cooperation has met severe opposition. This is mostly 
because mutual recognition by definition takes away some 
discretion to refuse to cooperate. Beside this obvious 
challenge, there are also concerns as to whether the other 
Member State with whom one should cooperate can be 
trusted. According to Andre Klip, mutual trust as a broad 
notion, and as a consequence of mutual recognition, can be 
seriously handicapped by disparities among the Member 
States. I agreed with his view because this issue can only be 
resolved by raising the standards of those Member States 
that do not perform so well on certain matters.  
As a result, there must be trust in the judicial decisions of 
the other Member State in order for cooperation in criminal 
matters to work properly. This should be done instead of 
relying on the reciprocity principle. However, this trust is 
undermined not only due to the recent decision of the CJEU 
but because of the recent changes observed in the post-
Lisbon period. Some of these issues were: the transitional 
period as regards the enforcement powers of the European 
Commission, the jurisdiction of the Court and the more 
permanent possibilities to opt in or engage in enhanced 
cooperation. This has led to an uneven development of the 
AFSJ for citizens and judicial cooperation measures and 
parts of the acquis which were not applicable in certain 
Member States’ (due to their choice not to opt in).   
Moreover, as I shown previously, there might be a risk of 
conflict between the three interlinked notions of freedom, 
security and justice due to this recent judgment, however I 
do not believe that the idea of balancing these three concepts 
is the proper way to proceed. This is because such an 
approach is problematic in the criminal justice area as it fails 
to appreciate that security interests need to present necessary 
and proportionate deviation from a fundamental right, as it 
becomes clear from Article 52(1) of the EU Charter.  
Hence, I strongly believe that under these circumstances the 
Union needs to find a way of reconciling these three notions 
rather than favoring one over the other, thus taking a more 
coherent approach to these issues. Accordingly, mutual 
recognition can only make sure that the extra national security 
interest is indeed recognized, but without additional 




The implications of a “genuine system of mutual recognition” 
would mean an abolition of all grounds for refusal in judicial 
cooperation and “full faith and credit” would constitutes the 
basis for the functioning of the European arrest warrant 
mechanism.  If these statements were true, then mutual 
recognition would have similar significance in criminal law 
as it had already achieved in the internal market. However, 
this is not the case. As it has been argued, the mutual 
recognition principle is rather difficult to apply in the AFSJ 
since its achievement is based on blind trust. Some scholars 
have even gone as far as arguing that this principle is 
incompatible with national sovereignty and fundamental 
rights. 
  
In contrast, the application of mutual recognition based on 
presumed mutual trust in the field of European criminal law 
was designed to achieve quasi-automaticity in law 
enforcement cooperation across EU. It is also true that mutual 
recognition based on trust is grounded in particular on 
Member States shard commitment to the principles of 
freedom, democracy and respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.  Nevertheless, 
several scholars have noted that an AFSJ based on this notion 
fails to take into account that such a European area requires 
that a citizen and his/her legal interests should not only be 
protected by the criminal justice system but also ‘from 
dangers of a criminal justice system operated in a reckless 
manner’.  
 
One way in which the Court tried to cope with the issue of 
fundamental rights, as a ground for non-execution of EAW 
during a surrender procedure, was to set limits to the 
automaticity of recognition. This was done by allowing the 
executing authorities to proceed with an extensive 
examination of fundamental rights impact (via the use of a 
two-tier test). Such assessment does not only increase the 
workload of the relevant competent authorities but it gives 
them a reason to doubt the system of its neighbor Member 
State. As it has been see, this runs counter to the aim which 
mutual recognition and mutual trust pursue. 
 
Furthermore, the change in the Court’s approach in Aranyosi 
and Căldăraru, which was discuss in the first two Chapters, 
does not only impact the relevant competent authorities, but 
also the citizens’ security since there is a clear and obvious 
risk that the offence would remain unpunished and that its 
perpetrator would reoffend (hence infringing the rights and 
freedoms of other EU citizens).  It would therefore go against 
not only the Union legislature’s intention of stipulating, 
exhaustively and for reasons of legal certainty, the cases in 
which the EAW may not be executed, but also against the 
case-law of the Court which applies a very strict interpretation 
of the FD and particularly of the grounds for refusal provided 
for in Article 3 and Article 4 thereof.   
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The recent cases of the CJEU brought about a potential 
conflict between the recognition of judicial decisions (based 
on trust) on the one hand and the use of fundamental rights 
considerations (such as unsatisfactory prison conditions) as 
a ground for non-execution of an EAW, on the other hand. 
The Court’s idea of balancing competing interests like 
mutual recognition and fundamental rights is, in general, 
problematic in the criminal justice area since it fails to 
appreciate that security interests need to present a necessary 
and proportionate deviation from a fundamental right, as it 
becomes clear from Article 52(1) of the Charter. 
 
For this reason, one needs to take into consideration the 
views of those scholars who advocated for a reconciliation 
of these two values, rather than employing a “balancing” 
approach whereby one interest is given priority at the 
expense of the other. Accordingly, mutual recognition can 
only make sure that the extra national security interest is 
indeed recognized, but without additional harmonization, 
that is as far as it can go.  
   
Moreover, it has been observed that current policies seek to 
achieve a high level of security by relying on mutual trust 
instead of common norms. This leads to individuals no 
longer feeling safe in their relationship with the State. 
Hence, one might argue for a ‘more European approach’ 
which would establish criteria under which it would be 
irrelevant in which Member State a certain offence was dealt 
with, the prevailing notion being that the interest of 
everyone involved should be taken into account. Under this 
approach, ‘a high level of safety’ would be offered to 
citizens of the Union and would not serve the interests of a 
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SRC 2016, November 30, 2016, The Netherlands. 
 
ROLE OF THE STUDENT 
a. Researcher’s Background 
 
This excerpt is part of a longer publication which has been 
written for my Thesis (March, 2017). My experience at 
Eurojust coupled with my education at The Hague University 
(LLB International and European Law Program) offered me 
the chance to write this paper due to the guidance offered 
firstly, from legal professionals at Eurojust, who enabled me 
to see the issues pertaining to the case I analyzed in my Thesis, 
and also from my Thesis supervisor, who offered me valuable 
feedback. 
 
b. Topic Background & Methodology 
 
 After my internship, I started by researching this case and I 
realized that because the Court’s decision was relatively new, 
there were few authors that discussed (in detail) this 
judgment. However, by reading the case again and again, I 
realized that I could analyze it from another perspective, a 
perspective that was not adopted by other authors. I started 
thinking of the impact this decision might have in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. This has led me to approach 
the subject from a security perspective by putting the 
individual/the EU citizen at the heart of the debate. Having 
established the path, I continued my research and I dived into 
more procedural aspects, in particular the European Arrest 
warrant system. Spending most of the days at the Peace Palace 
Library, I finally got the information needed to start on the 
structure. As a result, I identified three main issues and 
thought that such a complex subject should be discussed in 
three chapters. Each chapter aimed at analyzing each of these 
issues. 
 
The methodology/ approach: I started by conducting a legal 
analysis on the main case and as a result, I spotted the main 
difficulties that may have a practical impact in the AFSJ. I 
developed my arguments based on the existing issues and I 
supported my claims with academic literature, interpretations 
of primary and secondary legislation, different legal and 
policy documents delivered by EU institutions and different 
statistical data(Eurobarometer). The paper has also a 
normative dimension, in the sense that it tries to address the 
need for legal change in the EAW system. The overall study 
has been conducted by using empirical data to observe the 
internal impact that this judgment has.   
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